Optimizely Script Injection: Audit Third-Party JavaScript

The Optimizely script injection put malicious JavaScript on the websites of 178 organizations on November 16, including BBC, CNN, Zoom, HSBC and IKEA. An attacker exploited a flaw in Optimizely’s Web Experimentation platform and added code to customer projects, which visitors’ browsers loaded from a source the sites already trusted. As of November 18, Optimizely says the flaw is fixed and the injected code removed.
What Happened With the Optimizely Script Injection
Sites load Optimizely Web through one script tag that pulls a project snippet from Optimizely’s servers. According to Report URI, the security firm that found the attack, the attacker wrote a small loader into the snippet’s optional “Project JavaScript” field for many unrelated customers. The code kept arriving from Optimizely’s own content delivery network, so browsers trusted it.
Report URI checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found 188 infected, belonging to 178 organizations. Named victims include Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA and HSBC. The first injection it saw was at 04:21 UTC on November 16. All infected files were clean by late that evening.
The injected code swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skimmed card numbers, expiry dates and CVV codes typed into a site’s own payment forms, and stole cookies and page screenshots. On iPhones and iPads it delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits; Hudson Rock says a successful device compromise is not demonstrated. Estimates of the crypto sent to the attacker’s wallets range from about $2,300 (Galaxy Digital) to about $7,150 (Help Net Security); nobody can see how many cards or cookies were taken.
Optimizely’s status page, first updated on November 17, says an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation, that it fixed the flaw, removed the injected code and secured affected accounts. Optimizely told Gizmodo the flaw was in the Experimentation account signup flow, with no further detail. As of November 18, we found no CVE identifier.
Why It Matters
Patching and firewalls protect your own infrastructure. This attack never touched it: the code came from a vendor you had allowed on purpose. A Content Security Policy that lists the vendor’s domain gave no protection either. Of the affected organizations, only 24 had a policy strict enough to block the payload. Another 68 had none, and 50 had one that let it run and send data out.
For a Mittelstand online shop or customer portal, the question is whether you know which third-party scripts run on your login and checkout pages and who can change them. Card data typed into your own form fields is your problem even when someone else’s script took it. None of the sources we read names a German Optimizely customer. It is the same pattern as the Rank Math PRO supply chain attack in October: a trusted vendor channel carrying the attacker’s code.
What You Should Do Now
- If you use Optimizely Web, open every project’s Project JavaScript and every experiment’s custom code. Look for scripts you did not write, calls to atob( and the host 1688360[.]cc from Report URI’s findings. Review who has write access to your account (users, API tokens, integrations) and rotate credentials.
- If your own pages have card fields, treat cards entered on November 16 as potentially exposed. Tell your payment provider and data protection officer, and search proxy and CSP logs for requests to 1688360[.]cc since November 16.
- List every third-party script on login and checkout pages, with an owner for each, and ask each vendor who can change the code you load and how you would notice.
- Tighten your Content Security Policy: list only the hosts you need in script-src, drop ‘unsafe-eval’ and ‘strict-dynamic’ unless you chose them deliberately (Report URI found both let the payload through), and restrict connect-src to destinations you recognize. With no policy yet, start in report-only mode today.
DIESEC Perspective
Pinning a hash on a vendor snippet is hard when it changes with every published experiment (Assumption), so the useful controls are knowing what runs on your payment pages and limiting where it can send data.
Not sure which third-party scripts run on your checkout and what your Content Security Policy actually blocks? Contact DIESEC for a rapid third-party script and CSP review.
Sources: Report URI | Optimizely status page | SecurityWeek | Help Net Security | Gizmodo | StepSecurity
Published: 2026-11-19 | Category: Supply Chain Security | ~4 min read

